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1. Introduction 
As concern over climate change garners attention the question of whether it is happening 
gives way to what policymakers should do about it. The question of policy is an economic one. 
This research is necessary because climate change, left unchecked, threatens to permanently 
change our environment. 
In Economic terms, CO2 emissions would be described as an externality. The industries 
that produce the pollutant do not pay for the damages they inflict on the environment. 
Economists have deliberated on such externalities before. In a classic experiment, Plott argued 
that policy measures to internalize these externalities were necessary. That is, policies that 
include the cost of pollution in the economic decisions made by firms and consumers should be 
enacted. His reasoning, and experimental results, suggested that mere concern over the welfare 
of others is not sufficient to protect society from environmental damages (1983). 
Plott, however, did not consider a further complication of environmental economics. A 
politically attractive solution to climate change is to support research and development (R&D) as 
an answer to climate change. The studies I consider here will consider this question in 
conjunction with methods of internalizing climate change externalities. 
2. The Economics of Emissions Control 
Previous literature reviews exist for the economics of emissions control and so this 
section will be a summary discussion of them. The focus of this paper is the relationship between 
emissions control measures and emissions R&D. For a more extended discussion of 
environmental experimental economics see Noussair and Soest (2014), and Friesen and 
Gangadharan (2013). Emissions control can be achieved through either a carbon tax or a cap-
and-trade approach. There is some dispute over which is socially preferable and how to 
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implement either. The trade-offs are that cap-and-trade generally requires less action on the part 
of the government and allows for control over the quantity of emissions, while a carbon tax is the 
more price stable alternative (Congressional Budget Office, 2008). 
Because of the relative price stability of a carbon tax the Congressional Budget Office 
argues it is more efficient for the United States’ purposes than a cap and trade program (2008). 
They argue that there are rising marginal costs to reducing emissions as firms use the cheapest 
ways to reduce emissions first. But the marginal benefit of having less emissions remains 
constant. In other words, a cheaply eliminated unit of emissions has the same effect on climate 
change as does a more costly eliminated one. A cap-and-trade program would be inflexible in its 
response to these rising marginal costs, while a tax would not be. These issues are, however, only 
tangentially related to the relationship between emissions-saving policy of either kind and their 
effects on R&D. Both seek to address only one of the two salient market failures. 
The environmental market failure has been described in terms of an externality already. 
But R&D is associated with positive externalities as well. Addressing both externalities is 
considered the dominant strategy in the literature. For example, though there is substantial 
support for the development of emissions-saving technology in Europe (Bye & Jacobsen, 2011), 
R&D in the absence of environmental policies against pollution is likely to be below the socially 
optimal level (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). 
Besides being politically expedient, emissions-saving R&D has an economic argument 
for its support instead of emissions reducing technology (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005). If an 
effective carbon-abatement technology could be produced emissions reduction would be 
unnecessary. Yet this is unlikely as R&D is a product of investment and subject to two 
significant externalities. First, without emissions reducing policy, emissions-saving R&D would 
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be unprofitable for any given firm. Secondly, R&D is subject to the externalities described by 
Romer in the following section. 
3. Theoretical R&D Background: Endogenous Technological Change 
A typical macroeconomics textbook will present a growth accounting equation in which 
the total output of the economy depends on factors like capital, labor, and productivity inputs. 
While the factors in my textbook that drive capital and labor growth get their own chapters 
endogenous growth theory, the study of factors that drive productivity growth, gets three pages 
(Abel, Bernanke, & Croushore, 2011, p. 206, 228-231). The disparity is not particularly 
surprising. Modeling endogenous growth is difficult, and challenges core macroeconomic 
assumptions. When Romer uses this model he explains that “price-taking competition cannot be 
supported” and so instead he finds an equilibrium under monopolistic competition (1989). 
The conclusion Romer comes to which is of most interest is that too little human capital 
will be devoted to R&D in equilibrium. The theory is that this is because oftentimes the product 
of R&D is excludable, but nonrival. With R&D, this is often called knowledge spillovers. That 
is, using the patent system, a good produced by one firm’s research can be excluded from 
another, but the second firm’s consumption of that good does not rival the initial producer’s 
consumption of it. Because of this nonrival consumption knowledge spillovers are created. It 
follows from this that in perfect competition no private firm will participate in R&D. After all, 
there is nothing stopping the firm’s many competitors from stealing their research and thus 
matching their costs. When this happens, the researching firm has only the costs of research and 
no benefits from it. This is the reason the Solow model takes productivity as exogenous (Romer, 
1989, p. 7). 
Because of this market failure and environmental market failures, Jaffe et al. argue for a 
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“portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and 
adoption of environmentally beneficial technology” (2005, p. 1). Adding the environment into 
the picture, however, complicates the picture of R&D spillovers somewhat: 
This means that a specified level of environmental cleanup can be achieved at 
lower total cost to society, and it also means that a lower total level of pollution 
can be attained more efficiently than would be expected if the cost of cleanup 
were higher. Thus, in this simple static picture, technology improvements can be 
good for the environment and good for the firm that must meet environmental 
mandates. (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005, p. 166) 
 
Thus there is a dynamic relationship between technology and environmental protection. Given 
that there is an interplay between R&D and emissions policy, it may be advantageous for a 
country to incentivize emissions-saving R&D in particular. In fact, this is exactly the question 
Bye and Jacobsen as well as Schneider and Goulder consider, as I describe in the following 
section. 
Jaffe et al. break up the externalities associated with emissions R&D into knowledge and 
adoption externalities (2005). The knowledge spillovers are as they are described by Romer. The 
adoption externalities, however, may also have dynamic increasing returns. This stems from the 
fact that a technology diffuses gradually. Simply observing another firm using a new piece of 
technology can create a positive externality as the observer may become convinced that the 
technology is superior and subsequently reaps some benefit from it. There are also network 
externalities. Some technologies become more valuable as more people use them. Finally, there 
are “learning-by-doing” supply-side externalities. This refers to the fact that some technologies 
become easier to use with experience of using them. Together, these externalities mean almost 
all environmental economists recommend a combination of emissions-saving subsidies of some 
kind and emissions-reducing taxes or cap-and-trade policies. An early General Equilibrium 
Model employed by Schneider and Goulder makes just this argument (1997). 
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4. General Equilibrium Model 
General Equilibrium Models (GEM) are a logical choice for the study of emissions 
control as any such control affects many markets. While partial equilibrium models are far more 
familiar to new students of economics, a carbon tax would influence not just those doing the 
actual emitting of carbon, but those selling products that use the energy of those emissions. The 
general equilibrium model allows for multiple markets to come to an equilibrium, allowing for 
the effects of emissions and emissions-related R&D to be examined while holding other markets 
constant. 
An early GEM was used to argue that carbon taxes were a more efficient method of 
limiting emissions than R&D subsidies alone (Schneider & Goulder, 1997). They find that in a 
model that includes R&D spillovers, like the ones described by Romer, a carbon tax and a 
targeted R&D subsidy is the least costly emissions reduction strategy. 
Schneider and Goulder note that a carbon tax alone does provide some incentive for R&D 
by correcting for environmental externalities (1997). This is because under carbon taxes firms 
have an incentive to reduce emissions and thus have a willingness to pay for technology that 
would allow them to do so. This may be of particular interest to policy makers as it is easier to 
sell a voter on R&D than it is to sell them on any tax. Unfortunately, the authors note, despite the 
relative unpopularity of a carbon tax a tax is still less costly than subsidies alone for the economy 
as a whole (see Table A1). In their short paper, however, they do not consider a general R&D 
subsidy. Bye and Jacobsen take up this case in their GEM and find that, in contrast, a targeted 
R&D is not socially optimal. 
Bye and Jacobsen use the GEM to analyze the relationship between R&D and a carbon 
tax (2011). One complication of their study is induced technological change. That is, they do not 
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make the normal assumption that technological advancement is outside of their model. Instead, 
they include two R&D support strategies: general and emission-saving.  
They find that the general R&D support strategy is welfare superior but that the 
difference between general and emission-saving is smaller with high carbon taxes (see Table 
B2). This is an intuitive finding. Most economists would expect a less efficient result if a firm’s 
options were restricted: the emissions-saving strategy is just such a restriction. The shrinking 
difference is also unsurprising. The substitution effect suggests that as emissions become more 
expensive consumers of R&D would the relatively expensive good (emissions) for the relatively 
inexpensive good (emissions-saving technology). This means the emissions-saving R&D 
strategy becomes less restrictive as even without it firms would prefer it to general R&D at 
higher carbon tax levels, ceteris paribus. Bye and Jacobsen argue that this is because the effects 
of decreasing returns to scale and decreasing returns to knowledge are more significant in the 
emissions-saving strategy. 
Bye and Jacobsen take an emissions control that equals the “marginal environmental 
damages” of carbon emissions as granted. This means that the tax, in whatever form it is applied, 
would cost the polluter as much as the damage to the environment would harm everyone. A 
possible objection to their model is that they hold environmental quality constant in their policy 
simulations. While this may be realistic in the small open economy they are hypothetically 
creating, in a larger economy like the United States a policy change could have a measurable 
impact on environmental quality. Similarly, since a small open economy is their baseline (they 
use Norway), they assume any change in emissions quantity will not affect overall prices. This 
may not be a reasonable assumption for policy makers in the United States. 
What Bye and Jacobsen call carbon capture technology (CCS) is the subject of the 
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technological progress when their GEM uses the emissions-saving R&D. They cite an 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report for modeling several possibilities for such a 
technology. They use Norway from 2002 as the base economy, and model the different strategies 
as changes from that point on. 
5. Conclusion 
Proper execution of emissions-saving policy is nontrivial. Australia has recently made 
this quite evident. Robson writes that “Australia's carbon tax experience is an interesting case 
study in how not to go about implementing climate change policy” (2014, p. 43). And while 
R&D is a politically expedient answer to climate change legislation, the evidence does not 
support it being used alone. In Australia’s case, carbon permits were enacted on top of and in 
addition to new “complementary” emissions saving policies. The net effect of these changes 
were to increase energy prices, not reduce emissions, and damaged the government’s revenues 
(Robson, 2014). While action is needed, climate science must not be the only research consulted 
in making these decisions. 
Further research on the relationship between climate change policies and R&D could add 
political capital to the environmental cause. By eliminating the perception that policy makers 
should choose between R&D and emissions control, and that they work best in tandem, an 
argument can be made for significantly more economically-grounded legislation. While Bye and 
Jacobson's research is a start in this direction, they use a model which has limited applicability to 
the United States, a major CO2 producer. Extending their model could prove fruitful. 
Additionally, their model used a carbon tax, which at the moment is the most realistic. A cap-
and-trade program, however, may have R&D advantages. As of yet no such research exists. 
While the GEM has attractive features about it, a laboratory experiment allows for less 
assumptions than does a model which purports to simulate an entire economy. It has the 
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additional benefit of circumventing criticism of the assumption that people are rational decision-
makers by using actual people to make rational decisions. Such an experiment may also be able 
to incorporate the effects of political and technological uncertainty into the model. Such research 
is pressing since, as Schneider and Goulder point out, the costs of emissions control increase 
with time (1997). 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Costs of 15% reduction in CO2 emissions 1995-2095 
 
Source: Schneider & Goulder, 1997 
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Appendix B 
Table B2: Long-run effects of the R&D policy shifts. Percent changes from the baseline scenario. 
 
Source: Bye & Jacobsen, 2011 
